By now most of the world has calmed down after witnessing the chaos that swept the Iranian capital and elsewhere after Ahmadinejad was proclaimed, by his friend the Interior Minister, to have won the Iranian elections by a landslide. Iranian's have stood strong, either in their support of the current President or in support of the challenger Musavi. The louder of the two of course being the latter. After many rounds of violence and bloodshed it is clear that the establishment in Iran has won the battle. Every day they remained in power the opposition weakened. However the protesters have managed to deal the Supreme Leader a heavy blow that he may never fully recover from. The blow itself was not fatal, but the infection could very well be. Up until recently, no one would have dared shout "Death to Khamanei" on the streets. That would have been considered to be uncouth even for the dissidents because according to the Iranian-version of Shia Islamic Jurisprudence the "rahbar" (leader) acts on behalf of the 12th Imam, the hidden leader who will return to the Shia as a saviour and spread justice and peace to the world.
Khomeini left no one in doubt of the powers that should be granted to the Supreme Leader. The semi-divine status, given to himself, was at complete odds with traditional and mainstream Shia Islam. Shi'ism was not blind to the fact that religion plays an important role in the daily affairs of the Muslims but it had always called for limited interference from the clerics. Khomeini was not the first to dream of a ruling cleric and he was influenced by the ideas of 18th century father and son scholars Mohammed Mehdi and Ahmed Naraqi.
The Naraqi's (pictured) take their name from the village they were born in near Kashan, Iran in 1716 and 1771 respectively. They theorized that the scholar should also have power even in the political sphere and that an able jurist could also become a ruler. This theory was put into practice by Khomeini who expanded on the thesis and became an absolute authority over his subjects in Iran.
For those who are unfamiliar of the lengths Khomeini went in his argument that he should be obeyed as an absolute ruler this is an extract taken from the website of the Supreme Leader - note the constant references and comparisons Khomeini makes with the infallible Prophet and Imams;
"If an eligible person with these two characteristics [knowledge of the law and just] rises and comes to power, he will acquire the same wilāyah (authorities) which were established for the noble Prophet Muhammad (s.) as far as administering the society is concerned. And, therefore, all people are required to obey him."
This revival of Naraqi's thought did not go down too well with the majority of Ayatollahs. One man who did back Khomeini was Hussein Ali Montezeri. He published "Studies in Guardianship of the Jurist" and advocated the rule of the jurist on Islamic grounds. Ironically, after the revolution Montezeri saw the failure of good governance and was silenced after he raised his concerns with Khomeini. He is now still under house arrest in Qum for his opposition to the Islamic government.
Khomeini paved the way for this revival in a series of lectures he gave in Najaf in 1970. His lectures were quickly compiled and published as a book that was distributed to his followers. His main opposition at the time came from Abul-Qasim al-Khoei, who dismissed the idea of unlimited 'wilayat al-faqih' (Guardianship of the Jurist) because it had no legal basis or precedent for the Shia. He bases his argument on a verse of the Quran:
Only Allah is your Wali and His Messenger and those who believe, those who keep up prayers and pay the poor-rate while they bow. [
Shakir 5:55]
The meaning of the word "wali" is a major point of debate between the Shia and Sunni schools of thought. Regardless of differences in opinion between the two schools the Shia all agree that this is the verse in the Quran which explains the divine status of the 12 Imams. My grandfather argues that there can never be a jurist who can have the same "wilayah" (guardianship/authority) as the Imams and Prophet because God makes it clear that 'only' a certain few can have this status.
The schism that appeared continues to be relevant today. It is the focal point of everything that is going on in Iran today and it has also affected the future of Iraq. Debates over who was right and how much influence the clerics should have over the daily lives of Shia Muslims continue to this day with both sides passionately disagreeing with each other.
The issue of 'wilayat al-faqih' is still the most obvious difference between the Najaf school in Iraq and the Qum school in Iran.
The ignorance of this issue, or indifference, was a factor that led to the crushing of the 1991 uprising in Iraq. The United States feared, most likely due to resident Arabists, that if the rebels overthrew Saddam they would establish an Iranian-style theocracy in Baghdad. However, the Najaf seminary, and Iraqi's in general, would never have allowed the clerics to have the same powers their counterparts enjoy in Iran. This is even more evident when one looks at Iraq today.
"Wilayat al-Faqih" will be at the heart of the debate in the Middle-East and for Shias in particular for many more years to come because it is so central to what makes their world tick.
An article I wrote on the historical relationship between the Kurd's and Shia Arab's in Iraq published in the Kurdish Herald.
It was one of the most famous attacks against the British after the end of World War I. 200 Kurdish rebels joined forces with 400 Arab Shia rebels, led by Sheikh Hadi al-Makdoor, and attacked a British post in southern Iraq just before dawn. It was a surprise attack and the rebels overran the British barracks and killed over 300 enemy soldiers while capturing more than 100 British-Indians. This particular Shia-Kurdish attack against the British was immortalised by a famous Arab who shouted after the battle in poetic prose “Two-thirds of paradise is for our Hadi, and one-third is for kaka Ahmad and his Kurds!” [
Continued...]
‘Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy [towards Iraq] … is dangerously inadequate…in the long term, [the only acceptable strategy] means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy’ –
The above is part a letter that was sent to former US President Clinton in January 1998 and was signed by 18 former senior government officials, including some who made a come back in the Bush administration, like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz (Allawi 2007, p.62). Later that year regime change was officially on the agenda when the Iraq Liberation Act was signed by Clinton and outlined the measures to be taken to support Iraqi opposition groups in order to bring democracy to Iraq.
Some of the reasons for going to war include geo-political ambitions, oil, Israel, WMD’s, the war on terror, spreading democracy and a flex of American muscle.
Regime change was on the agenda when Clinton signed the ILA but the wheels were set in motion long before the Act was even drafted. In July 1996, a new report titled ‘A Clean Break – A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’ was produced and signed by many neo-conservatives who called for the removal of Saddam Hussein as ‘a strategic objective for Israel’ (Allawi 2007, p.65).
While protecting Israel could be a reason for going to war it could not be the publicly stated reason, for very obvious reasons. One of the most mentioned reasons for going to war against Iraq was the threat posed by WMD’s. One thing for certain is that Saddam not only had these weapons but he had used them against his own people in horrific acts of genocide and mass-murder. But did he still have them by 2003? The Bush and Blair administrations certainly believed, or at least wanted the rest of the world to believe, that he in fact not only still had access to these weapons but that Iraq could deploy them within 45 minutes of the order given by Saddam. The report on Iraq’s capability became infamously known as the ‘dodgy dossiers’.
In September 2002 in response to a parliamentary question on whether or not Blair would support regime change in Iraq the Prime Minister responded by saying that while regime change in Iraq would be a good thing it would not be the purpose of going to war against Iraq. The purpose was clearly defined as disarming Saddam of weapons (Hansard). In January and February, just one month before the shock and awe campaign began, Blair made it clear that the reason for going to war against Iraq was WMD’s. Blair said in an official statement on Iraq “I detest his regime. But even now he can save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully.”
While Blair doggedly stuck to the WMD line, the US government persuaded its people by adding the threat of these weapons with the benefit of regime change in order to re-shape the Middle-East. The Americans have not signed up to the International Criminal Court and were less worried about the legality of war. Blair couldn’t speak about regime change because if that was his reason the war would have been illegal under International Law. For the Americans however, regime change in Baghdad was to be the ‘key that unlocked the whole of the Middle-East’ (Dodge 2005, p.7)
Another reason for going to war, and one not lost on members who encouraged and supported the war in the US was to give the world a mighty show of American muscle. David Frum & Richard Perle (2003,p.33) argue that as well as the obvious victory over Saddam, promoting democracy and eliminating the threat of WMD’s the invasion of Iraq meant the world could see ‘vivid and compelling demonstrations of Americans ability to win a swift and total victory over significant enemy forces’ and this would no doubt send a clear message to countries like Iran and North Korea. Patrick Cockburn (2007, p.2) also points out that the main reason for the invasion was because ‘the White House thought it could win such a conflict very easily and to its great advantage’.
The invasion plan was born out of a new foreign policy that advocates pre-emptive strikes in order to safeguard US and her allies’ interests. Speaking to Congress shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks the US President pointed his finger at several states who he claimed were state sponsors of terror. This was in effect the pre-battle speech on the ‘War on Terror’. Bush made it clear when he said ‘this [Iraq] is a regime that has something to hide from the civilised world, states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an ‘axis of evil’, arming to threaten the peace of the world.’ (Galbraith 2007, p.71)
Another reason for war was that the Pentagon had a certain circle of neo-conservatives who believed that the Gulf War in 1991 had left ‘unfinished business’ which had to be dealt with (Tripp 2007, p.270). In other words, Bush the son needed to finish off what Bush the father started and topple Saddam for real this time with brute force and not just threats.
Ties with terrorist organizations were also cited as one of the reasons for going to war. Although Saddam was a secular dictator, it is argued (Frum & Perle 2003, p.46), that he would, and did, join forces with Islamists who although have radically different ideologies actually have something in common. Hatred for America. Documents recovered in Iraqi Intelligence HQ revealed that Bin Laden had discussed with the Iraqi government a joint campaign against the US. There is also some intelligence to suggest that Ayman al-Zawahiri, now al-Qaeda’s no.2, visited Baghdad and received funds from Saddam in 1998, before he joined forces with Bin Laden.
Another often cited reason for the war was of course oil. The codename of the invasion of Iraq was only changed to ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ after the acronym for the suggested codename ‘Operation Iraqi Liberation’ - OIL - was noticed.
Former President Bush and former VP Cheney have strong ties to the oil industry and securing a country such as Iraq, with its vast seas of undiscovered crude oil would be extremely beneficial both personally and for the interests of their country. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan revealed in 2007 ‘I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil.’
Just a few months after the war started the Polish Foreign Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, said ‘We have never hidden our desire for Polish oil companies to finally have access to sources of commodities... [access to oil] is our ultimate objective’ (BBC).
Whether it be because of oil, WMD’s, links with terrorism, Israel, human rights, promotion of democracy or even divine intervention, the war against Iraq will forever change the Middle-East and we all had front-row seats to see the removal of one of the most horrific and brutal dictators of the 20th century.
Bibliography:
Cockburn, Patrick. 2007, The Occupation, War and Resistance in Iraq, London: Verso.
David Frum & Richard Perle 2003, An End to Evil, How to Win the War on Terror, New York: Random House.
Galbraith, Peter W. 2007, The End of Iraq, How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, London: Pocket Books.
Tripp, Charles 2007, A History of Iraq, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dodge, Toby. 2005, Iraq’s Future: The aftermath of regime change, London: Routledge.
Allawi, Ali 2007. The Occupation of Iraq, Winning the War, Losing the Peace, New Haven: Yale University Press.
The Naraqi's (pictured) take their name from the village they were born in near Kashan, Iran in 1716 and 1771 respectively. They theorized that the scholar should also have power even in the political sphere and that an able jurist could also become a ruler. This theory was put into practice by Khomeini who expanded on the thesis and became an absolute authority over his subjects in Iran.