Iraq: Countdown to War

Tony Blair - A Journey

Random House: London.

“In other words, left to itself, the country could have just about managed. What made the task all the harder, occasionally verging on the impossible, were the activities of the outside influences, hell-bent on chaos and destruction. Both al-Qaeda and Iran knew what was at stake in Iraq. Neither was going to let the nation stabilise without a fight, and as our will weakened, theirs grew. It was then only through Prime Minister Nouri Maliki showing (frankly unanticipated) leadership qualities – and the Bush decision to surge – that the balance of will to win was shifted back towards the forces of democracy and modernisation.”

“Inaction is a decision to maintain the status quo. Maintenance of the status quo has its own result, and usually its own dynamic. So removing Saddam had enormous consequence. Failure to remove him would not have been free of consequence. We can debate the nature of such consequence and how profound it would have been, but unquestionably, there would have been one.”

“Above all, there was a sense of an emergency. In this time, the failure to act was indeed an action with its own consequence and that consequence might be profoundly adverse. At that moment, the fear of history’s judgement was not the fear that came with action, but with inaction. How to change the world was a tough challenge to answer; not to answer it, to be paralysed in indecision, was deemed the greater risk, by a large margin.”

“But I was also aware that the new world taking shape around us, Britain and Europe were going to face a much more uncertain future without America. As the defeat of Communism showed – let’s be clear, without America, it would not have been defeated – our alliance with the US mattered… So when they had need of us, were we really going to refuse: or, even worse, hope they succeeded but could do it without us? I reflected and felt the weight of an alliance and its history, not oppressively but insistently, a call to duty, a call to act, a call to be at their side”

“It’s true to say, however, that at that point [September 2002] the downside risk of military action revolved around how easy or hard it would be to remove Saddam, and any humanitarian fallout. There was, of course, also the Sunni/Shia issue, but never at that state – or indeed until after Saddam’s removal – was the true threat perceived: outside interference by al-Qaeda and Iran.”

“Hans [Blix] was a curious fellow. He was smart and capable, and I liked him, but his problem was that he felt the weight of the politics of the inspection. This was quiet natural, but in truth he just needed to do his job… He kept saying, ‘I have to decide for war or peace’, and I kept saying, ‘You don’t. Just tell us your honest assessment.’

“I was about as isolated as it is possible to be in politics… And worrying, not because I might do down – in a sense, so what? – but because so much was at stake. War and peace. The struggle against terrorism… I tried to work out what was the right thing to do. I was past expediency, past political calculation, past personal introspection. I knew this could be the end politically. I just wanted to know: what is the right thing?”